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FRA-2001-8728-20

February 11, 2002

Ms. Ivornette Lynch, Docket Clerk  
Office of Chief Counsel  
Federal Railroad Administration RCC-10  
1120 Vermont Ave. NW  
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Washington, DC 20590

FEDERAL RAILROAD  
ADMINISTRATION  
2002 FEB 22 PM 4:01  
OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL


Re: FRA Docket No. FRA-2001-8728

U.S. Locational Requirement for Dispatching of U.S. Rail Operations

Dear Ms. Lynch:

Please find enclosed the Comments of the American Train Dispatchers' Department - BLE ("ATDD"). While this filing has already been made via electronic submission, we were unable to attach the three exhibits to that submission, so we are also filing a hard copy original. Thank you.

Respectfully submitted,

  
Michael S. Wolly  
Attorney for ATDD

Enclosure

**BEFORE THE  
FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION**

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**In the Matter of:**

**FRA DOCKET NO. FRA-2001-8728**

**U.S. LOCATIONAL REQUIREMENT FOR DISPATCHING  
OF U.S. RAIL OPERATIONS**

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**COMMENTS OF  
THE AMERICAN TRAIN DISPATCHERS DEPARTMENT  
OF THE INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS**

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**FEDERAL RAILROAD  
ADMINISTRATION  
2002 FEB 22 PM 4: 01  
OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL**

The American Train Dispatchers Department of the International Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers ("ATDD") is a labor organization that serves as the collective bargaining representative for the train dispatchers employed by many of the nation's rail carriers, including Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad, Norfolk Southern Railway, CSX Transportation, Inc., Consolidated Rail Corporation, Kansas City Southern Railway, Grand Trunk Western Railroad, CP Rail - Soo Line, and AMTRAK. ATDD submits the following comments on the Interim Rule promulgated by the Federal Railroad Administration that requires all dispatching of railroad operations that occur in the United States to be performed in the United States with three minor exceptions. ATDD's Comments applaud the FRA for implementing the Interim Rule and for the comprehensive investigation it undertook before doing so. We urge that with a few minor revisions the rule be made permanent.

## THE TRAIN DISPATCHER'S JOB

The FRA has conducted or commissioned numerous studies of the train dispatcher's job. In 1971, the agency commissioned a study of the responsibilities of the railroad train dispatcher that culminated in a 1974 report by D.B. Devoe entitled *An Analysis of the Job of the Railroad Train Dispatcher*. Then, in 1987, the FRA undertook a nationwide study of train dispatching offices. The results of that study, entitled *National Train Dispatcher Safety Assessment 1987-1988* were published in February 1990. The agency submitted an extensive follow-up Report to Congress in January 1995, called *Train Dispatchers Follow-up Review*." In 1998, the FRA published the results of a study it contracted-for of training for train dispatchers: Reinach, Gertler, and Kuehn, *Training Requirements for Railroad Dispatchers: Objectives, Syllabi and Test Designs* U.S.D.O.T. (1998). Finally, most recently, the FRA commissioned an analysis of the cognitive tasks train dispatchers perform; that analysis was published in September 2001: Roth, Malsch, and Muller, *Understanding How Train Dispatchers Manage and Control Trains: Results of a Cognitive Task Analysis* U.S.D.O.T. (2001)( hereafter "*Understanding*"). These reports reflect a keen understanding on the part of the agency of the unique and crucial role that train dispatchers play in ensuring safe rail operations in this country.

Train dispatchers control the movement of rail traffic in and out of main terminals, across main lines, over trackage that is signaled and trackage that is not signaled (so-called "dark territory"), trackage under maintenance and repair, over stationary and draw bridges, in yards, and in both urban and rural areas. The trains they dispatch carry passengers, freight, or both. Communication is at the heart of their jobs. Train dispatchers communicate with other railroad employees (i.e., locomotive engineers, maintenance-of-way gangs, ground personnel, other tra n

dispatchers) as well as non-railroad personnel (such as police, fire and emergency medical personnel, and members of the public). The most recent FRA-commissioned study explained:

The dispatchers foremost responsibility is to ensure the safety of trains and personnel on the track. This implies ensuring that the operating rules are followed, [fn. omitted] monitoring train traffic and track use to ensure that no conflict or potentially dangerous situations arise, and alerting locomotive engineers and other personnel of potentially dangerous situations.

After that, the dispatchers responsibilities are to:

- Route passenger trains efficiently so that the trains meet their schedule. If a regularly scheduled train is more than 5 minutes late, the dispatcher must provide an explanation for the delay.
- Route freight trains and trains from other railroads requesting passage through their territory.
- Route special trains such as privately commissioned cars.
- Schedule safe access time on the track for maintenance and inspection work that needs to be conducted on and around the track (e.g., inspecting the track, fixing a malfunctioning signal or switch).

*Understanding*, p. 19.

The communication demands placed on train dispatchers are heavy. Among other things, dispatchers must:

- Answer requests for and issue train movement and track use authorization to locomotive engineers, MOW staff, etc.
- Inform locomotive engineers whether there are any updates to speed bulletins or other messages.
- Find out the status of trains - where they are, why they are delayed.
- Exchange information regarding rail conditions (e.g., broken rail, malfunctioning signals, obstacles on the track, trespassers).
- Coordinate with train masters and yard masters.

- Coordinate with emergency response personnel (e.g., police, fire, and ambulance) in accident situations.

Id. at 37.

Fewer than 3,000 individuals fill these highly-specialized jobs. They control 170,512 miles of domestic rail trackage owned by 560 railroads. The vast majority of this domestic trackage - 120,000 miles - is operated by the eight Class I carriers.<sup>1</sup> Source: Association of American Railroads for year 2000 [AAR.org]. The transfer of the responsibilities of even a small number of these dispatchers would have a dramatic effect on the U.S. rail system.

It is obvious that a potential for calamity exists whenever a train dispatcher's ability to perform his/her heavy responsibilities is compromised. This potential has led Congress and the FRA to impose significant restrictions on dispatchers in order to protect rail safety on U.S. trackage. As the agency explains in its justification for the Interim Rule, train dispatchers in this country are subject to restrictions on their hours of service and to random, reasonable suspicion, return-to-duty, follow-up and post-incident testing for drug or alcohol abuse. Further they must submit to periodic operating rules and efficiency testing. Train dispatchers are personally subject to sanctions for violation of the FRA's safety standards. These laws are not enforceable against employees of foreign corporations working in foreign countries.

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<sup>1</sup> By contrast, there are over 15,000 air traffic controllers employed by the Federal Aviation Administration to control the air traffic in the United States. Source: National Air Traffic Controllers Association [NATCA.com].

## ATDD'S COMMENTS

The FRA properly has recognized that technology has advanced to the point that trains in this country could be dispatched from anywhere in the world. ATDD concurs in the agency's determination that to allow available technology to be utilized so that extraterritorial dispatching can happen and that the regulatory protection afforded by the FRA and the statutes it administers can be evaded is not in the nation's best interests.

We agree that the FRA cannot be assured of access to facilities outside this country. Indeed, we believe that absent a treaty provision, no U.S. agency can enter foreign soil to enforce U.S. laws or regulations. We know of no treaty provision in place that would allow the FRA to do so. The FRA is correct that without such access, its various safety programs cannot work.

The FRA expresses uncertainty over its ability to obtain access to railroad facilities outside the U.S. "or whether the laws of foreign countries will adequately safeguard United States rail operations." 66 Federal Register at 63847. The agency recognizes that it could issue an emergency order "against a railroad that does not have in place a program imposing adequate safety requirements for extraterritorial persons that dispatch domestic railroad operations," but expresses concern that it would have to "meet the high burden of proof entailed in sustaining such an [emergency] order if it is challenged." *Id.* That standard need not be met in the agency's ordinary safety oversight of domestic rail operations. And the FRA should not have to meet that standard to satisfy its day-to-day oversight obligations.

By these Comments, ATDD should not be seen to be suggesting that any country wants to promote hazardous working conditions or unsafe dispatching practices. But the FRA is correct in comparing the level of safety regulation and protection required elsewhere with what is required

in the United States. The agency should cast a wary eye on any suggestion that the FRA should wait-and-see whether standards less stringent than those applied to dispatching operations here are enough to ensure the safe dispatching operations from outside the borders until after an event involving those foreign standards occurs. The standards in place here already have been tested and validated. Extraterritorial dispatching operations should not serve as a laboratory for reducing the level of regulation and oversight in this country. The FRA is right in insisting that the regulatory gap be completely filled before any extraterritorial dispatching is permitted.

ATDD agrees wholeheartedly with the agency's rationale for the action it has taken. We offer these observations on certain particular issues addressed in the Supplementary Information that accompanies the Interim Rule:

### **Language Differences**

Plainly, language differences can lead to the transmission of inaccurate or incomplete data. There are inherent problems in English-speaking train and engine crews receiving written or verbal instructions from dispatchers in French-speaking Quebec or in Spanish-speaking Mexico. Language comprehension difficulties can result in delays in the transmission and comprehension of information the timely delivery of which is crucial to safe operations.

Dispatchers' primary means of monitoring activity and communicating with people in the field (i.e., locomotive engineers, MOW personnel, trainmasters) is via a voice radio system. Dispatchers continuously monitor the radio channel that covers communication in their territory and broadcast messages over voice radio. A telephone is available that they occasionally use for one-to-one conversation with people in the field (e.g., MOW foremen, trainmasters).

*Understanding*, p. 17. Oral communication is particularly significant in unsignaled areas ("dark

territory”):

In dark territory, the dispatcher does not get automatic indication of the location of the train, nor does the train get automatic signals allowing the locomotive engineer to move through the territory. In dark territory, the locomotive engineer must call the dispatcher, usually via voice radio when he is about to enter a block of track in a dark territory and request authorization to enter the block. In those cases, the dispatcher must manually block the portion of track in question (referred to as a block) and issue a Movement Permit Form D (referred to as Form D) to allow the train to enter that block. [Fn. omitted] The Form D is a written form that is filled out by the dispatcher and read to the locomotive engineer. The locomotive engineer must read back the Form D before it goes into effect. When the locomotive engineer has passed the block, they must call in to indicate that they are through and the Form D is fulfilled.

Some track vehicles (e.g., track cars used for inspection or maintenance) do not activate the signal system even on portions of track that are under CTC or ABS control. [fn. omitted] Those vehicles are treated similarly to trains in dark territory.

Id. at 19-20. We have attached as Exhibit A a table from *Understanding* (p. 30-31) that identifies the many categories of personnel in the field with whom a dispatcher communicates orally and the types of information exchanged.

The problems that language differences can cause are two-sided. Not only might the dispatcher's instructions to other personnel be misunderstood, the dispatcher may not fully comprehend what he/she is being told from the field. By monitoring radio channels, the dispatcher obtains information that allows him/her to anticipate problems and delays in advance. If the dispatcher is not conversant in English, he/she would miss out on potentially important information exchanged between the locomotive engineer and the mechanical department, for example, regarding difficulties with the locomotive. Similarly, the dispatcher might miss hearing conversations between MOW personnel that misconstrue restrictions on track availability, an error the dispatcher could otherwise correct. “The ability to ‘listen in’ on communications



directed at others that have a bearing on achievement of their own goals, and to recognize when information in their possession is of relevance to others and to broadcast it are important contributors to efficient management of track use in today's environment." *Understanding* at 55.

The situation would likely be worse when U.S. citizens encounter emergency situations (as they often do), such as automatic crossing protection not functioning properly,, automobiles, fire equipment, rescue equipment and other obstructions along the right-of way; tracks washed out or covered by slides; or trespassers or vandals in and around equipment. By analogy, on January 18, 2002, the Federal Aviation Administration issued new guidelines that require the use of "clear, concise, plain English" for communications between flight crews and cabin crews in security-threatened situations. See Exhibit B. hereto.

### **SACP**

The FRA correctly points to the value of its Safety Assurance and Compliance Program ("SACP") in resolving issues related to train dispatching that are parochial to one rail system and that are common to all railroads on a voluntary basis. The FRA's identification of the value of SACP during Union Pacific's merger woes is but one example. The SACP has treated dispatching-related issues on numerous occasions. These issues have ranged from joint track occupancy to slow order limitations to dead spots in radio communications. The agency is correct in observing that such problem-solving could not have been effectuated without the FRA access to carrier dispatching facilities, access that cannot be guaranteed in other countries.

We find it hard to see how the FRA can continue its pro-active approach to influence the non-regulated aspects of dispatching operations through the SACP and through its impromptu

visits to dispatching centers to ensure that dispatching is being conducted safely if dispatching centers are located in foreign countries. Railroad employees and their representatives are a crucial element in exposing safety hazards or potential safety problems in the SACP process. This fundamental principle would be impossible to duplicate abroad. The FRA's ability to promote compliance, conduct inspections, investigate accidents and incidents and impose sanctions inevitably would stop at the border.

### **Security**

The security threat posed by terrorism can no longer be considered remote. Not only could the nerve center of a railroad be destroyed by an attack on a train dispatching center, that attack would not necessarily have to be physical to succeed. The technology involved in dispatching operations is now such that "hacking" alone could temporarily break down, if not totally invalidate, a rail traffic control operation. Technological infiltration could result in terrorist access to signaling systems that would allow signals to be cleared for a train armed with explosives or germ warfare traffic to be rerouted in a scheme to create collisions or derailments.

### **Incompatible Units of Measure**

The Interim Rule also recognizes the potential for trouble in the incompatible units of measure used in Canada and Mexico. The U.S. operates on the English system; our neighbors use the metric system. This duality in measurements likely would add to confusion and delay in rail operations in cross-border dispatching, particularly in instances where a dispatcher's responsibilities encompass both domestic and foreign trackage. Absent conversion of entire

systems to one standard of measure or the other, all that could be done is to post both measurements side by side. We believe this could increase, rather than diminish, the possibility of confusion. Even if measurements of track and speed information were to reflect the dual systems [i.e.: 1 k/6/10m], the possibility of misdirections at any time, much less during times of heavy activity, is obvious.

### **Different Labor Laws**

The proponents of extraterritorial dispatching ignore the difficulties posed by different labor laws in foreign countries. The disruption of rail operations abroad, even when resulting from lawful work stoppages, would place continuing U.S. rail operations in jeopardy. No court in this country would have the jurisdiction to require employees abroad to continue to provide the dispatching services required by U.S. carriers.<sup>2</sup>

Carriers may argue that the FRA should not be concerned about their extraterritorial operations because they would follow FRA's regulations and guidelines voluntarily because it is good business to do so. Whether a carrier would adhere to a regulation that can't be enforced against it, however, has never been a proper consideration the delimiting mandatory regulation. Certainly there are regulations with which carriers would not comply were they not required to do

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<sup>2</sup> This possibility is not as remote as one might think. The Amtrak Reform Council (ARC) is actively considering options that bids would be solicited from private companies to operate passenger train service in the United States under contract to governmental authorities. ARC is soliciting interest from, among others, the Association of Train Operating Companies (ATOC) in London, England. From this revelation, it would appear that European-based companies dispatching the Northeast Corridor is not out of the realm of possibility. This also underscores how vulnerable United States commuter operations since rail strikes have disrupted rail service across southeast England twice in the past few weeks.

so. And even if there are none that are now in place that the carriers dislike, the agency may impose additional regulations for which compliance is problematic.

### **Deficiencies in the Interim Rule**

The explanations offered by the agency for the Interim Rule are broad and well-considered. ATDD respectfully submits that the rule would better serve the agency's objectives if certain minor changes were made. We offer those proposals here:

#### **Add Conditions on Grandfathering**

The Supplementary Information explaining the reasons for the rule does not address a major component of train dispatcher qualification and training: familiarity with territory over which dispatching will occur. One of the major shortcomings that ATDD has seen whenever consolidation of train dispatching operations has happened is the carrier's failure to afford dispatchers who are being assigned new territory an opportunity to ride the territory before beginning to dispatch trains over it. We believe that one of the problems Union Pacific Railroad Company faced when it placed management officials in dispatching desks was the managers' unfamiliarity with the territories they were assigned to oversee.<sup>3</sup>

The train dispatcher is the eyes and ears of the train crew as to track conditions beyond

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<sup>3</sup> In the UP/SP crisis, the FRA was directly involved in the realignment of dispatching territories and assignments at UP's Harriman Center. The agency plainly could not engage in the same hands-on involvement in an office on foreign soil.

their immediate line of sight.<sup>4</sup> If the dispatcher has personally seen the territory, when back in the office he/she can visualize the physical terrain ahead of a train and better respond to protect the safety of the crew. Personal knowledge of the physical aspects of the territory under a dispatcher's control is an essential part of a dispatcher's credentials because the computerized display at the dispatcher's work station does not relate this information. Were dispatching to be allowed from outside the United States, problems associated with lack of familiarization trips likely would be exacerbated. We suggest therefore that § 241.9(c) of the Interim Rule be amended to add the italicized proviso below:

Grandfathering. A railroad may require or permit one of its dispatchers located in a foreign country or in a territory or possession of the United States to dispatch a railroad operation that occurs on a track segment located in the United States, the operation of which track segment was normally controlled during the month of December 1999 by a dispatcher located in that foreign country or that territory or possession of the United States, *provided that the dispatcher assigned has been familiarized with the track segment located in the United States by personally observing the territory over which trains will be dispatched no less than semi-annually.*

Section 241.9(d) of the Interim Rule should be amended by adding the following subsection (4):

*The dispatcher has become familiar with the territory within the United States over which trains will be dispatched no less than semi-annually by personally observing that trackage no less than semi-annually.*

As for grandfathering existing extra-territorial dispatching in place in December 1999, ATDD accepts the current limited operation, but urges the FRA to abrogate this exception as ownership of the excepted segment changes or the operations on the trackage change. At that

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<sup>4</sup> "Many dispatch decisions depend on having accurate knowledge of the physical layout of the track and surrounding geography. Dispatchers stressed that this is critical to maintaining the safety of personnel working on the track as well as enabling dispatchers to effectively coordinate response in emergencies." *Understanding* at 57.

time, the only exception for extraterritorial dispatching would be in true emergencies.

### **Eliminate Waivers**

ATDD believes that train dispatching is so central to the safety and security of U.S. rail operations that there should be no waiver from the requirements of the Interim Rule available. Section 241.7 should be eliminated. The amount of time it would take to rescind such a waiver once it has been granted may be much too late to be effectual. Once a waiver is given, it would be a difficult task to assure immediate compliance with orders to shut down or alter operations in a time of emergency.

In addition, while it is impossible to measure loyalty to one's own country, it is not difficult to understand the emotion of nationalism in a time of international crisis. When one is removed from the ties that bind a person to his/her country, there is even less reason to choose patriotism over profits. This connection is a critical element that cannot be measured, but is nonetheless vital.

Moreover, how would the FRA handle a dispatch center that initially satisfies the conditions outlined in the Interim Rule to consider a waiver but later undergoes change that, were it in place originally, would have constituted ground for denying a waiver? What criteria of changes in track configurations, additional mileage, signal system modification/elimination or addition of certain consignees such as defense or hazardous material manufacturers would mandate withdrawal of the waiver?

Should the FRA still believe that waivers are appropriate, no waiver should be granted until *every* concern raised and *every* potential problem identified in the other sections of the rule is

solved. Further, at a minimum, the FRA should require reporting of all changes that would have affected an initial waiver decision as the changes occur, so the agency could act expeditiously to respond to the changed circumstances and rescind the waiver that was originally granted based on different conditions.

### **Tighten the Emergency Exception**

The Interim Rule allows for an exception in the event of emergencies. We submit that if such an exception is to be allowed, the definition of emergency must be extremely confined. Even when such severely limited circumstances arise, carriers should not be permitted to move dispatching operations to another country unless they can prove that such operations could not be transferred to other locations inside this country (such as to another domestic carrier or to temporary stations on its own property).

Indeed, the FRA should require that carriers have plans in place to deal with such emergencies so that domestic alternatives are readily available to them. There are such contingency plans in place for our federal aviation system (See Exhibit C hereto); we submit they should be promulgated for our rail traffic control system as well. We believe the authority for such a requirement already exists in Section 20103 of title 49.<sup>5</sup>

The reality that law enforcement and security agencies in the United States cannot protect

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<sup>5</sup> The Interim Rule considers the possibility that domestic carriers might transfer their dispatching operations abroad in the event of emergencies here. The FRA also should consider what would occur if foreign dispatching centers controlling American tracks face emergencies. It is entirely possible that an emergency could so affect a foreign dispatching center that control of U.S. trackage would have to be moved quickly to another location. If the FRA allows any foreign dispatching of U.S. rail traffic, it should insist that control return to the U.S. in the event of a foreign emergency.

extraterritorial dispatching facilities is only part of the problem. The FRA or other U.S. government agencies may not even be aware that a threat or attempt of sabotage is made on a dispatch control center if it is outside our borders; yet any threat, act of sabotage or disruption of rail operations over U.S. trackage could affect our nation's security. After September 11, this country called upon our National Guard to monitor security at our airports. We cannot assume other countries will exhibit similar diligence to monitor security at their train dispatching centers.



## CONCLUSION

Foreign carriers have no compelling need to dispatching rail traffic on trackage they own in the United States from dispatching operations outside this country. They can establish dispatching offices in this country just as domestic carriers have done. Having such operations abroad is a merely matter of convenience for those foreign carriers and nothing more. When such operations are located outside the U.S., there can be no assurance of safety or accountability beyond that which flows from general market concerns. Carriers are concerned primarily with the bottom line; absent regulatory oversight, actions necessary to assure safe train dispatching operations likely would be treated as stepchildren to corporate profit.

The FRA's Interim Rule and its accompanying justifications demonstrate that the FRA has carefully examined the problems that extraterritorial train dispatching operations raise in a thorough, comprehensive way. ATDD compliments the agency on its diligence. The modifications we suggest would only strengthen the agency's Interim Rule and enable the agency to achieve the goals it hopes to accomplish by the rule more easily. We urge that the Interim Rule be amended to adopt ATDD's suggestions and then be made permanent.

Respectfully submitted,

F.L. McCann, President  
American Train Dispatchers Department - BLE



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Attorneys for ATDD

**Table 5. Examples of Personnel Outside the Dispatch Center that Dispatchers Communicate with and the Types of Information Exchanged.**

<b>Personnel</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Mode of Communication</b>	<b>Information Dispatcher Passes</b>	<b>Information Passed to Dispatcher</b>
Locomotive Engineer/ Train Conductor of Regularly Scheduled Passenger Train	Field	Telephone/Radio	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Speed bulletins.</li> <li>• Any changes in meets.</li> <li>• Explanation for delays.</li> <li>• Inform when another train is about to go ahead of him.</li> <li>• To ask which track they prefer (when there is an option).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Report track, signal, engine, or equipment malfunctions.</li> <li>• Report obstructions or trespassers on track.</li> <li>• Report consist (particularly if it is longer than usual).</li> <li>• Requests for particular route.</li> <li>• Check whether there are any messages.</li> </ul>
Locomotive Engineer of Freight Train	Field	Telephone/Radio		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Destination.</li> <li>• Consist (type of engine, number of cars).</li> <li>• Crew and time on duty.</li> </ul>
Locomotive Engineer in Dark Territory	Field	Telephone/Radio	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Issue Form Ds.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Location.</li> <li>• Request for Form D.</li> <li>• Call in to indicate when clear of a block, so Form D can be canceled.</li> </ul>
Track Car/ Non-shunting equipment/ Extra Work Train	Field	Telephone/Radio	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Issue Form Ds.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Location, destination.</li> <li>• Request for Form D.</li> <li>• Call in to indicate when clear of a block, so Form D can be canceled.</li> </ul>
Personnel working on or around track (e.g., MOW Foreman, Signal Maintainer, Flagmen)	Field	Telephone/Radio	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Issue Form Ds.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Requests foul time.</li> <li>• Indicates location of work.</li> <li>• Informs when work is completed and Form D can be canceled.</li> </ul>

**Table 5. Examples of Personnel Outside the Dispatch Center that Dispatchers Communicate with and the Types of Information Exchanged (cont.)**

<b>Personnel</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Mode of Communication</b>	<b>Information Dispatcher Passes</b>	<b>Information Passed to Dispatcher</b>
Train Station Director/Train Station Master	Field	Telephone/Radio	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Train delays.</li> <li>• Coordinate on identifying substitute equipment.</li> <li>• Coordinate identifying tracks on which to put trains.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Train delays leaving station.</li> </ul>
Control Tower	Field	Telephone/Radio	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Train delays</li> <li>• On what track to expect a train.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Train delays.</li> <li>• What track to expect a train on.</li> </ul>
Yard Master	Field	Telephone/Radio	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What trains are coming in and on what track.</li> <li>• Coordinate train movements in and out of yard.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What trains are coming out and on what track.</li> </ul>
Emergency Personnel (Fire, Police, Ambulance)	Field	Telephone/Radio	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Location of/ directions to emergency.</li> <li>• Coordinate on emergencies.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Tracks to be cleared.</li> </ul>

### 3.5 What Makes Railroad Dispatching Difficult?

Routing scheduled trains under signal control is not considered difficult. The tracks to be used, and the meets (the time and place when two trains will meet) are predefined and routing decisions are straightforward.

What makes dispatching difficult is dealing with *unplanned demands* on track use, and the need for changing a *plan* in response to train delays, and track outages.

This requires keeping track of where trains are, whether they will reach destination points (meets, stations) on time or will be delayed, and how long the delays will be. This can be exacerbated in the case of dark territory where trains are not presented on the computer displays.

These are compounded by the fact that:

- Workload is high, and
- Knowledge demands are high.



DOT 07-02

Friday, January 18, 2002

Contact: Paul Takemoto

Telephone: 202-366-5580

**Department of Transportation Meets Mandate for Plans for Training Screeners and Flight Crews**  
***Private Sector Help Sought for Training More than 30,000 Screeners***

The Transportation Security Administration and Federal Aviation Administration today published training plans for aviation security, meeting a deadline in the Aviation and Transportation Security Act. Plans for the training of security screeners, and guidance for the training of flight crews for dealing with threats, were required within 60 days of the passage of the Act, Nov. 19, 2001.

Under Secretary of Transportation for Security John W. Magaw today submitted a plan to Transportation Secretary Norman Y. Mineta and to Congress that would provide for premium-quality, intense and measurable training for security screeners employed by the Transportation Security Administration at the 429 U.S. airports with commercial service. More than 30,000 screeners will be deployed by the TSA by Nov. 19, as mandated in the Aviation and Transportation Security Act.

"The TSA is firmly committed to creating a screener workforce of the highest quality, one that is instilled with pride and commands the respect of the traveling public," Magaw said. "We intend to offer an attractive and rewarding career path for screeners that will include varied, stimulating work and the chance for promotion. That path begins with intensive training."

The proposed training plan charts a course with the dual objective of protecting the system and serving the flying public. Key elements include:

- Screening of persons, baggage, and cargo;
- Stress management and conflict resolution;
- Professional interaction with passengers.

The TSA curriculum will be competency-based and outcome-driven, which means that training will correlate directly to competencies required. Competencies identified to date include:

- Discerning and discriminating ability;
- Ability to perform duties while being subject to distractions;
- Ability to follow sets of complex directions;
- Multi-tasking ability and alertness to objectives;
- Ability to perform well under demanding situations;
- Ability to comprehend and reason effectively;
- Ability to identify principles governing relationships between objects;
- Ability to cope with conflicts.

Separately, the TSA is issuing two requests for proposals (RFPs) as part of its ongoing efforts to tap into private sector experience and expertise for assistance in successfully completing a deployment of more than 30,000 airport security screeners and law enforcement officers over the next 10 months. These RFPs are devoted to mission critical aspects of the TSA, as follows:

- Screener/Law Enforcement Officer (LEO) Qualifications, Recruitment and Examination (QRE). The Aviation and Transportation Security Act includes stringent employment standards for airport screeners, and for law enforcement officers. Contractor assistance will be critical in helping to recruit, assess and interview tens of thousands of applicants.
- Screener Training. The Act requires a minimum of 40 hours of classroom training, 60 hours of on-the-job training, and an exam for each screener. Contractor assistance will be critical in helping to develop and finalize curriculum, train trainers, and conduct training at numerous facilities across the nation.

The RFP for Screener Training will be available at: <http://www.eps.gov> (solicitation number: DTTS59-02-R-00439). The RFP for Screener/LEO QRE will be available at: <http://www.eps.gov> (solicitation number: DTTS59-02-R-00440). Interested companies must respond by Jan. 28. The TSA intends to award contracts by Feb. 19.

Also today, the Federal Aviation Administration, as mandated by the act, issued new, detailed guidance for training crew members in dealing with potential threats, especially hijackings. The guidance, developed in consultation with airlines, pilots and flight attendants, represents a shift in strategy from passive to active resistance by crewmembers.

While actual training guidance cannot be made public due to national security concerns, highlights include:

- Any passenger disturbance should be considered suspicious, as it could be a diversion for other more serious acts.
- In a threatening situation, crewmembers must act as a team. Should a threat arise, the cabin crew and flight crew must communicate in clear, concise, plain English.
- In any suspected or actual hijack attempt, the flight crew should land the airplane as soon as possible to minimize the time hijackers would have to commandeer the aircraft and use it as a weapon of mass destruction.

In accordance with the statute, airlines have 60 days to amend their training programs to incorporate these guidelines. Once the new training program is approved, crewmembers must be trained within six months.

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*National Public Radio (NPR) October 19, 2001 Friday*

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National Public Radio (NPR)

**SHOW:** All Things Considered (8:00 PM ET) - NPR

October 19, 2001 Friday

**LENGTH:** 538 words

**HEADLINE:** **FAA** implements new procedures for dealing with air **emergencies**

**ANCHORS:** ROBERT SIEGEL; LINDA WERTHEIMER

**REPORTERS:** MARY ANN AKERS

**BODY:**

ROBERT SIEGEL, host:

From NPR News, this is ALL THINGS CONSIDERED. I'm Robert Siegel.

LINDA WERTHEIMER, host:

And I'm Linda Wertheimer.

The **Federal Aviation Administration** has implemented new procedures for responding to **air traffic emergencies**. Now controllers can contact the military almost instantaneously if a commercial aircraft is in danger. NPR's Mary Ann Akers reports. MARY ANN AKERS reporting:

Before the attacks of September 11th, it took several phone calls to several different places before military jets were scrambled. Now the **FAA** has established a much closer relationship with the military. They have a joint **plan** of action to respond to **emergencies**, which begins with the **air traffic** controllers. Now that **emergency** can be defined as a hijacked plane headed like a missile for a skyscraper, individual controllers have more authority to react. William Shumann is a spokesman for the **FAA**.

Mr. WILLIAM SHUMANN (Spokesman, **FAA**): Currently, if a controller sees an aircraft making unusual or unexpected maneuvers or unusual radio transmissions or no radio transmissions, we now have procedures where he can notify NORAD, the North American Aerospace Defense Command, directly.

AKERS: NORAD is ultimately responsible for protecting the airspace, and its new goal is to be able to scramble jets immediately, which didn't happen on September 11th. NORAD was notified of the first hijacked plane about five minutes before it slammed into the Trade Center, according to Major Mike Schneider(ph). And by the time they were airborne, fighter

jets were still eight minutes away when the second plane hit the Trade Center. Major Schneider says NORAD now shares a computer datalink with the **FAA** so that civil aviation and the military view the same real-time map of the airspace. NORAD no longer waits for the **FAA** to provide that information.

Major MIKE SCHNEIDER (NORAD): So we're able to look at any flight, any track and get all the details instantaneously. And then, of course, there are special codes, terminologies and such, that immediately relay to us the level of the threat or at least the level of interest of this unknown track. And we can scramble fighters immediately to investigate and identify the intentions of this aircraft.

AKERS: In addition, NORAD and the **FAA** have established a 24-hour live conference call. Any controller who identifies a potential threat can get on the line and report directly to NORAD. Schneider says it's all about streamlining communication with the **FAA** so NORAD can successfully protect the US airspace from future attacks.

Maj. SCHNEIDER: There's no ubiquitous solve-all approach to any threat because there are so many threats. What we can say is that we are in certainly the best posture that we've ever been with the **FAA** to respond as immediately as possible to any level of threat.

AKERS: NORAD has over a hundred military aircraft on ready alert, including those flying routine patrols over New York and Washington, and randomly over other major cities. Earlier this week the **FAA** administrator, Jane Garvey, was asked if she thought the horror of September 11th was a national security failure or an aviation failure.

Ms. JANE GARVEY (**FAA** Administrator): It's probably a collective failure. Certainly from aviation's perspective we had established an aviation security system that was based on a far different threat. None of us imagined a threat of this sort.

AKERS: And because that threat is a shocking reality, aviation security and national security are now one in the same. Mary Ann Akers, NPR News, Chicago.

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